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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the determinants of the price and non-price terms of banks loans to 
SMEs. Responses from a survey questionnaire answered by 74 SMEs that had applied for and were 
granted bank loans is analyzed using SEM-PLS. The results indicate that the condition and capacity of the 
SME is significant in influencing interest rates while the SME’s ability to provide collateral, its capital and 
the character significantly influence the non-price terms. Soft information is highly significant in 
influencing both the price and non-price terms. 
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loans to SMEs.  Responses from a survey questionnaire answered by 74 SMEs that had applied 
for and were granted bank loans is analyzed using SEM-PLS.  The results indicate that the 
condition and capacity of the SME is significant in influencing interest rates while the SME’s 
ability to provide collateral, its capital and the character significantly influence the non-price terms.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate the various factors that determine the price and non-price 
terms of bank loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in an emerging market such as 
Malaysia.  Most SMEs have limited access to capital markets (Bek and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006) and 
with under-developed and bank-dominated financial systems and capital markets in Asia (Yoshino 
and Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2015), banks are the most important source of external financing for 
SMEs.  The opaque nature of SMEs and the high level of information asymmetry (DeHaas et al., 
2010) further complicate the issue, more so in emerging markets where the lack of proper records 
and documentation is a common problem among SMEs.  Therefore an understanding of how banks 
operate and make decisions in these markets is very important.   
 
Previous studies on bank loan contracts (Anagnostopoulou and Konstantinos, 2016; English and 
Nelson, 1999; Neuberger and Räthke-Doppner, 2015; Strahan, 1999) have mainly focused on 
developed markets where capital markets are well developed and a wide range of financing 
solutions are available. In most cases, even when the studies investigate developing markets, the 
focus has been on large firms for which data is easily available through secondary sources.  
Although research on large firms do shed light on bank financing decisions, the findings may not 
apply to SMEs as SMEs can be very different from large firms in terms of their operations (Xiang 
and Worthington, 2015), their access to finance (Wasiuzzaman and Nurdin, 2018) and the way 
they are perceived by banks in terms of their credit risk.  Credit risk is an important element in the 
formulation of bank loan contracts but the evaluation of the credit risk of SMEs is not as straight 
forward as that of large firms due to the high levels of information asymmetry arising due to their 
opaque nature.  Additionally, commercial banks are thought to discriminate against SMEs as the 
loans requested are smaller in size (Copisarow, 2000) and smaller loans are riskier with higher 
transaction costs (Benston, 1964; Titman and Wessels, 1988).  Therefore, what is known so far 
about the financing decisions by banks through studies on large firms may not be entirely 
applicable to SMEs.   
 
This study therefore aims to study the influence of each dimension of the 5Cs of credit (condition, 
capital, collateral, capacity and character) on the price and non-price terms of bank loans.  
Additionally, the influence of soft information is also assessed.  Further, SMEs in Malaysia are 
chosen as the sample of this study due to two reasons.  First, historically it is believed that small 
banks are the main providers of loans to SMEs due to their organizational structure which makes 
it more convenient for them to undertake small business lending (Berger and Black, 2011; 
Durguner, 2017; Uchida, 2011).  The Malaysian banking system is however unique in that there 
are only 8 large local commercial banks with branches all over the country.  The banking system 
in Malaysia has evolved following the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Prior to the 1997 financial 
crisis, the banking system was fragmented with 77 domestic banking institutions.  However, post 
the financial crisis, the central bank, or the Bank Negara Malaysia, took measures to strengthen 
the local banking system through the consolidation and rationalization of the banking system, 
where the banks were merged into ten anchor banks by year 2002 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2011).  
Further mergers were encouraged to further strengthen the banking system to ensure its 
competitiveness with international banks.  Second, the Government of Malaysia provides various 
initiatives to assist SMEs in various ways, including financially.  Grants and financial schemes are 
channeled through commercial banks, development financial institutions and the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation Bhd. and the government encourages these financial institutions to assist the SMEs 
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by offering fast, convenient and flexible financing to the SMEs.  However, the funds and grants 
have not been fully utilized by the SMEs (Bernama, 2018).  Therefore, the absence of small banks 
in the country and the ample funding available but lack of utilization may mean that the results in 
this study may be different from those of previous studies. 
 
To achieve the aim of this study, a survey questionnaire was distributed to a total of 456 SMEs in 
the manufacturing industry, out of which 156 surveys were returned.  However, out of the 156, 
after excluding the responses of those SMEs that did not apply for any loans or whose loan 
applications were rejected, a total of 74 usable responses were obtained.  Analysis of the survey 
results show significant influences of only character and collateral on the non-price terms of bank 
loans.   On the other hand, only condition has a significant positive influence on the price terms of 
bank loans (i.e. the interest rate charged). Soft information, measured via processing time, is found 
to have a significant positive influence on both the price and non-price terms of bank loans while 
both capacity and capital do not significantly influence in both cases. 
 
The results are significant as the different importance of each factor is shown, i.e. while some 
influence the price terms and others the non-price terms.  The study therefore contributes 
significantly to literature on SME financing issues and on bank financing as it provides a better 
understanding of the differing importance of the different dimensions of creditworthiness on the 
terms of bank loans.  
 
The rest of the study is as follows: the next section discusses the literatures related to this study 
and the relationships between each dimension of creditworthiness and the price and non-price 
terms of bank loans. This is followed with a section discussing the data collection process and the 
measurement of variables.  Analysis is carried out using SEM-PLS and the results of the analysis 
are then presented in the next section followed by a section where the results are discussed.  The 
study is then concluded in the final section.  
 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
SMEs in Asia are very reliant on banks as their source of external financing (Beck et al., 2008) 
due to the under-developed financial systems and capital markets.  The lack of documentation and 
financial records and the resulting high levels of information asymmetry makes it difficult for 
banks to assess their credit risk (De Haas et al., 2010).  Banks rely heavily on credit ratings when 
making loan pricing and credit granting decisions (Bottazzi et al., 2014).  The credit rating (or 
creditworthiness) is a valuation performed by banks based on the SME’s financial capacity and 
willingness to repay its loan (Safi and Lin, 2014) and is used to determine the possibility that the 
borrower (in this case the SME) may default on his/her debt obligation.   Information is gathered 
to assess the credit ratings of borrowers through hard, historical information about the borrower 
and the business and/or through relationship lending which enables the gathering of soft 
information through close bank-customer relationship over time (Boot, 2000).   
Past studies have mostly found that higher credit scores imply lower credit risk and this has 
favorable influences on bank loan terms and conditions, i.e. the better the credit score, the better 
the terms offered by the bank.  The approval or rejection of an SME’s loan request by the banks 
and the terms it received on its loans (if successful) therefore depends very much on the rating 
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assigned to it by the banks.  The positive relationship between credit rating and terms of loan is 
explained by the argument that firms with better credit rating, i.e. higher credit scores, are less 
risky and will more likely get better loan terms such as lower interest rates on loans (Neuberger 
and Räthke-Doppner, 2015).  Ono et al. (2016) find that firms are less likely to change their main 
bank when they have better credit ratings in order to secure better terms and improved access to 
future financing.  English and Nelson (1999) confirm that banks in England have at least 
rudimentary risk rating systems in place and that the price and non-price of bank loans is 
determined by the loan risk, which is determined by the rating system.  This is confirmed by 
Strahan (1999) who suggests that the price and non-price terms of banks loans are used as 
complements in dealing with borrower risk.  Hence, tighter non-price terms are imposed on riskier 
firms.  Haron and Shanmugam’s (1994) study of bank officers in Malaysian commercial banks 
who were involved in approval of loans to Malaysian SMEs finds that the 5Cs of credit are the 
basic factors considered by those banks when assessing the credit rating of loan applicants. 
 
Many studies in the past have investigated the influence of the 5Cs of credit and macroeconomic 
factors on the credit risk of borrowers, hence the bank loan’s terms and conditions, but most of 
these studies focus on some or all the above mentioned 5 factors although much attention has been 
given to the role of collateral.  For instance, Berger and Udell (1990) find that the pledging of 
collateral by firms tends to indicate higher risk borrowers and hence riskier loans.  This is 
confirmed by Jiménez and Saurina (2003) who find higher chances of default on collateralized 
loans.  Strahan (1999) finds that small firms are mostly provided small loans, which have short 
maturity and are required to secure the loans by collateral.  Additionally, Strahan (1999) finds that 
size and performance of a firm does affect the non-price terms of a loan, i.e. large and profitable 
firms enjoy better non-price terms.  According to Uchida (2010) banks mainly focus on the 
relationship, financial statement and collateral factors when deciding on whether to grant a loan or 
not.  Neuberger and Räthke-Doppner (2015) find that late payments have strong influence on loan 
pricing.  Anagnostopoulou and Konstantinos (2016) find that macroeconomic variables can 
significantly explain the loan terms and conditions offered to borrowers and in fact the effect of 
the macroeconomic variables are found to be distinct or incremental to any influence on the terms 
and conditions from firm-specific and country-specific institutional factor.   
 
While the 5Cs of credit are important in lending decisions, most studies have focused mainly on 
the role of collateral.  This study however does not focus on the overall credit rating or on a specific 
dimension of creditworthiness such as collateral but on all its dimensions, specifically, capacity, 




Capacity refers to a borrower’s ability to meet loan payments (Rose, 2002).  An SME that is 
capable of repaying its loans is deemed to be less risky to a bank when the bank considers its loan 
application.  More profitable firms are more capable of paying both their current and future loan 
payments and are therefore deemed to be more creditworthy (Johnston and Morduch, 2008) and 
can therefore borrow with better loan terms from banks (Strahan, 1999).   Unfortunately, SMEs 
are reputed to lack capacity thus they are only able to secure small amounts of funds from financial 
institutions (Nyamboga et al., 2014) at high loan rates.  Banks also impose stricter non-price terms, 
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i.e. collateral requirement, loan maturity and loan size.  The SME would need to provide collateral 
to back its loans and will be approved smaller loans with shorter maturity period. 
 
H1a: Banks charge lower loan rates on SMEs with better capacity. 
 
H1b: Banks impose better non-price loan terms on SMEs with better capacity. 
 
Capital refers to the money invested in the business and is an indicator of how much is at risk 
should the business fail (Rose, 2002).  Banks view capital as an important factor when considering 
loan applications because capital indicates the default risk of the firm.  The higher the firm’s or 
owner’s capital, the lower the probability of default by the firm/owner hence the lower the default 
risk borne by the bank resulting in better loan terms offered by the bank.  Additionally, larger 
capital investment indicates greater commitment to the business since the owner/SME has more 
assets and money at stake.  Therefore, an SME is able to secure loans with better terms when it 
has greater capital as it is considered less risky. 
 
On the other hand, when a firm has large amounts of capital, it relies more on its internal financing 
rather than on external finance.  Hence, it may lack credit history and the unavailability or lack of 
borrowing information increases information asymmetry resulting in difficulties in securing loans 
and/or tougher loan terms (Shin and Park, 1999; Shen et al., 2009). 
 
H2a: Banks impose lower loan rates on SMEs with greater capital. 
 
H2b: Banks impose better non-price loan terms on SMEs with greater capital. 
 
Ayyagari et al. (2010) show that having good credit history signals a strong character.  Firms that 
default on their payments are more likely to default again and are perceived as having higher 
default risk by banks, therefore the banks impose stricter terms, more requirements, screening and 
longer processing time for loan approvals when granting loans to these firms (Comeig et al., 2015).  
Firms with better repayment history are preferred by the banks as they are perceived to be less 
risky.   
 
H3a: Banks charge lower loan rates on SMEs with better character. 
 
H3b: Banks impose better non-price loan terms on SMEs with better character.  
 
According to Berger and Udell (1990), conventional wisdom among banks is that highest risk 
borrowers tend to pledge collateral.  Accordingly, study by Jiménez and Saurina (2004) finds that 
collateralized loans are associated with higher probabilities of default since the pledging of 
collateral becomes a disincentive to undertake adequate screening of potential borrowers by the 
banks when evaluating a loan application.  Additionally, there is the optimistic businessman who 
underestimates his chance of going bankrupt and is therefore willing to provide the collateral 
required to obtain the financing for his project.   
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However, prior studies have mostly found that higher pledged collateral can reduce the demand 
for financial reporting (Minnis and Sutherland, 2017) and helps attenuate the problem of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004).  Low risk borrowers are willing to pledge 
more and better collateral as they are less likely to lose it (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004).  Loan 
interest rates depend on the amount of collateral the applicant submits, i.e. borrowers that pledge 
higher collateral get lower rates of interest (Chan and Kantas, 1985; Comeig et al., 2015).  
Additionally, Uchida (2011) suggests that banks require more collateral as compensation for 
shortfall in repayment from the previous borrowing of the borrower.  Hence it is expected that: 
 
H4a: Banks charge lower loan rates on SMEs that pledge higher collateral. 
 
H4b: Banks impose better non-price loan terms on SMEs that pledge higher collateral. 
 
The condition of an SME refers to the state of the borrower or/and the economy, which can change 
over time and is beyond the control of the lender or the borrower.  Theoretically, banks would 
prefer to give out loans to firms in better conditions.  Banks need to also analyze how changing 
economic conditions of the economy might affect the loan as the loan value could be eroded in a 
recession or due to inflation (Rose and Hudgins, 2010).  The sensitivity of the business or the 
industry the business is in affects the business’s credit rating and therefore the terms of loan.  Since 
SMEs are generally dependent on the domestic market, macroeconomic conditions should affect 
the demand for the products/services, with a corresponding effect on the SME’s revenues 
(Anagnostopoulou and Drakos, 2016).   Additionally, SMEs are assumed to be more sensitive to 
economic downturns compared to large firms hence their probabilities of default tend to increase 
during these periods (Dietsch and Petey, 2004).  SMEs whose business income is sensitive to the 
economic conditions and the outlook for its industry is not good, have higher probabilities of 
default, which depends on current income and is linked to uncertainty about future income (Louzis 
et al., 2010).   Sensitivity of an SME’s business can thus affect the firm’s financial stability and 
financial risk and so the SME is perceived as risky to the bank, resulting in stricter loan terms and 
conditions by banks. 
 
H5a: Banks charge higher loan rates on SMEs whose business is more sensitive to 
macroeconomic conditions. 
  
H5b: Banks impose stricter non-price terms on SMEs whose business is more sensitive to 
macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Prior studies have shown that relationship lending influences loan terms.  The use of soft 
information in relationship lending results in better loan terms and credit access (Boot, 2000).  As 
more soft information is gathered about the quality of the borrower, the problem of information 
asymmetry is reduced, resulting in a reduction in credit risk (Neuberger and Räthke-Doppner, 
2015).   Therefore, banks charge lower loan rates when more soft information is gathered 
(Neuberger and Räthke-Doppner, 2015).  Additionally, Bharath et al. (2011) find that because 
relationships reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers, the likelihood for 
collateral to be pledged is reduced, consistent with the reduction in adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems.  They also find that relationships result in shorter loan maturity for the lowest 
quality borrowers as shorter maturity loans require more frequent monitoring but relationships 
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reduce the cost of monitoring.    Bharath et al. (2011) posit that relationships are especially valuable 
when borrower transparency is low. Since SMEs are well-known to be opaque in nature with high 
levels of information asymmetry, relationship lending should have considerable influence on the 
price and non-price terms of bank loans to the SMEs. 
 
H6a: Banks charge lower loan rates when they are able to collect more soft information on 
the SME. 
 
H6b: Banks impose better non-price terms when they are able to collect more soft 
information on the SME. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Sampling method and procedures 
  
Data is collected from SMEs in the manufacturing sector located in the states of Selangor and the 
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur via the convenient sampling method. A questionnaire was 
distributed to a total of 456 SMEs that were as SMEs from the manufacturing sector by cross 
referencing the list of manufacturing firms in the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturer (FMM) 
directory with the list of SMEs in the SME Corporation (a government organization dedicated to 
the development of SMEs in Malaysia) website. To ensure that the SME is from the manufacturing 
sector, the survey instrument included a screening question.  A pilot test was initially conducted 
and necessary modifications were carried out on the survey questions based on the results of the 
pilot test data.  The questionnaires were personally distributed to the SMEs in order to explain to 
them the research and its purpose.  However, the questionnaires were also sent to the respondents 
for the second time via email if they requested it.  Finance officers in the SME were approached 
but in case of no specific or multiple job function(s), as can be found in most SMEs, the 
questionnaire was passed on to the Human Resource (HR) manager or to the person responsible 
for, and with knowledge of, the finance function of the firm.  Out of the 456 questionnaires 
distributed, a total of 158 responses were returned with only 145 usable responses.  However, since 
the focus of this study is on the terms of loans, the responses of respondents who had not applied 
for a loan or whose loan applications were rejected, is not used as they could not answer the 
questions relating to the terms of loans.  Only those respondents that had applied for a loan in the 
past 12 months and the loan was granted are considered in this study as only these SMEs were 
offered loans with various terms and conditions, resulting in a final sample of 74 respondents. 
Therefore, despite a response rate of 34.6%, the final sample represents 16.4% of the population 
of the study.  Although a sample size of more than 100 is ideal as suggested by Bartlett et al. 
(2001), the 10 times rule of thumb by Hair et al. (2010) is used here to justify the use of the small 
sample size in this study.  Since the model consists of a total of 6 variables, the required minimum 
of 60 respondents is fulfilled.   
 
The demographic profile of the respondents based on the frequency and proportion are presented 
in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Demographic Profile of Respondents 
 
 Freq % 
LEGAL 
Sole proprietorship 5 6.76 
Partnership 8 10.81 
Private limited 61 82.43 
AGE 
Less than 5 years 3 4.05 
Between 5 to 10 years 2 2.70 
More than 10 years 69 93.24 
TYPE 
Subsidiary/Branch company 28 37.84 
Independent 46 62.16 
SIZE 
Small 29 39.19 
Medium 45 60.81 
PREFERRED SOURCE OF FINANCING 
Internal funds or retained earnings 23 31.08 
Owner’s contribution or new equity shares 7 9.46 
Borrowed from banks: private and state-owned 31 41.89 
Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers 10 13.51 
Others: money lenders, friends, relatives 3 4.05 
 
Most of the respondents are independent (62%) private-limited SMEs (82%) that are more than 10 
years old (93.24%).  It is interesting to note that out of the 145 SMEs only 74 applied for a loan 
and were granted the loan and out of these 75, 93% are more than 10 years old. This shows the 
bias towards SMEs with histories and track records in loan approval process.   In terms of size, 
39% of the respondents are small enterprises while 61% are medium ones.  The most preferred 
source of financing is borrowing from banks (42%), followed by the use of internal funds and 
retained earnings (31%) and credit from suppliers and advances from customers (13.5%). 
Although not reported in Table 1, it is found that 92% of the respondents indicated that their loan 
applications were with private commercial banks.  The rest (8%) obtained their loans from either 
state-owned banks or government agencies, or from non-bank financial institutions. Further, the 
top three reasons given for applying for financing are: working capital and cash flow (64.86%), 
purchase of equipment and vehicle (47.30%) and business growth/expansion (29.73%). 
 
Measurement of Variables 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the loan terms offered to the SMEs by the banks where they 
applied for their loan within the last 12 months.  Only those SME that had applied for the loan and 
the loan was approved could answer the question.  For all the dependent and independent variables, 
the respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which they agree with the statements using a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 being “Strongly Disagree” to 5 being “Strongly Agree”.  
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Items used to measure loan terms are adopted from ECB (2014).  However, only the items relevant 
to this study, i.e. interest rates, size of loan, loan maturity and collateral requirement are used.  
Since this study investigates both the price and non-price terms of the loan separately, there are 2 
dependent variables and 2 models in this study, where the price terms of the loan is a single item 
construct measured by the statement - ‘Interest rates charged to us are low’ - while the non-price 
items are measured by the statements - ‘Size of loan or credit line approved to us is high’, ‘Loan 
maturity approved to us is long’ and ‘Collateral requirement imposed on us is low’. 
 
The independent variables are ‘Condition’, ‘Capital’, ‘Collateral’, ‘Capacity’ and ‘Character’ to 
represent hard information while ‘Processing Time’ is the independent variable which represent 
the soft information collected about the SME.  To assess the sensitivity of the SME to economic 
conditions (or the ‘Condition’), the statements are adopted from Rose (2002).  Specifically, the 
statements are: ‘Our business and industry are less sensitive to business cycles and changes in 
technology’, ‘Regulations, politics and environment has little effect on our business’ and ‘Inflation 
has little impact on our balance sheet and cash flows’.  Statements to measure how much is at risk 
should the business fail (or the ‘Capital’) are also adopted from Rose (2002).  The statements are: 
‘Our firm record shows strong past earnings, dividends, and sales’, ‘Our firm has adequate liquid 
reserves’, ‘Our firm has high turnover of payables, account receivables and inventory’ and ‘Our 
firm has a good and effective management team’. Statements to measure the ability of the SME to 
provide collateral are adopted from various sources.  The statements are: ‘Our firm is able to 
provide required the collateral’, ‘The value of our collateral is high’, ‘Our firm is able to provide 
guarantors as per bank requirements’ and ‘Our firm owns most of our assets (land, buildings, 
vehicle, machinery, equipment)’.  Items to assess the SME’s ability to meet the loan payments (or 
the ‘Capacity’) are adopted from various sources.  Specifically, the statements are: ‘Our firm is 
able to handle its debt capacity’, ‘Our firm successfully managed its payments/commitments in 
the past’, ‘Our firm is able to repay its debt’ and ‘Our firm has strong cash flow and financial 
viability’.  The SME’s attitude towards its loan obligations (or the ‘Character’) is measured 
adopted from Harvey et al. (2012).  The statements are: ‘Banks are willing to provide credit to our 
firm’, ‘Business partners are willing to provide credit to our firm’ and ‘Investors are willing to 
invest in our firm’.  Finally, ‘Processing Time’ is a single item construct which is measured by the 
statement ‘Time taken to process the loan is short’ adopted from ECB (2014).  The items and the 
sources from which they were adopted are provided in Table 2. 
 
Since the items for the dependent and independent variables are taken from various sources and 
have not been used in previous empirical studies, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is first carried 
out to correctly identify the dimensions or the factors for each variable.  The strength of the inter-
correlation in the correlation matrix is checked and found to be more than 0.3 as recommended by 
Tabachnick & Fidell (1996). Bartlett’s t-test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) and the Kaiser-Meyer-
Oklin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1970) are also used for multi-item constructs 
to assess the factorability of the data. It is found that all values of the Bartlett’s test are significant 
(p-value<0.05) and KMO results are more than 0.6 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).   
The final items for each construct (dependent and independent variables) and the source from 
which the items are adopted are presented in Table 2. Also provided in Table 2 are the KMO and 
the Bartlett’s test results for each construct. 
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Table 2: Items for each construct in measurement model using Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Item Name Item Source KMO Bartlett’s 
 PRICE TERMS OF LOAN (price) 
terms_price Interest rates charged to us is low. European Central Bank Survey (2014)   
NON-PRICE TERMS OF LOAN (nonprice) 
terms_size Size of loan or credit line approved to us is high. European Central Bank Survey (2014) 
0.733 0.000 terms_maturity Loan maturity approved to us is long. European Central Bank Survey (2014) 
terms_colla Collateral requirement imposed to us is low. European Central Bank Survey (2014) 
   
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Item Name Item Source KMO Bartlett’s 
 CONDITION   
cond1 Our business and industry is less sensitive to business cycles and 
changes in technology. 
(Rose, 2002) 
0.681 0.000 cond2 Regulations, politics and environment has little effect on our 
business. 
(Rose, 2002) 
cond3 Inflation has little impact on our balance sheet and cash flows. (Rose, 2002) 
 CAPITAL   




cap2 Our firm has adequate liquid reserves. (Rose, 2002) 
cap3  Our firm has high turnover of payables, account receivables & 
inventory. 
(Rose, 2002) 
cap4  Our firm has a good and effective management team. (Rose, 2002) 
 COLLATERAL   
colla1 Our firm is able to provide required collateral. European Central Bank Survey (2014) 
0.809 0.000 
colla2  The value of our collateral is high. Harvey et al. (2012) 
colla3  Our firm is able to provide guarantors as per bank requirements. Harvey et al. (2012) 
colla4  Our firm owns most of our assets (land, buildings, vehicle, 
machinery, equipment) 
(Rose, 2002) 
 CAPACITY   
capa1 Our firm is able to handle its debt capacity. Berger and Schaeck (2011) 
0.759 0.000 capa2  Our firm successfully managed its payments/commitments in the 
past. 
Love and Mylenko (2003) 
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capa3  Our firm is able to repay its debt. Mohd Harif et al. (2011) 
capa4  Our firm has strong cash flow and financial viability. Mohd Harif et al. (2011) 
 CHARACTER   
char1 Banks are willing to provide credit to our firm. Harvey et al. (2012) 
0.663 0.000 
char2  Business partners are willing to provide credit to our firm. Harvey et al. (2012) 
char3  Investors are willing to invest in our firm. Harvey et al. (2012) 
 PROCESSING TIME   
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The Structural Model 
 
Analysis is carried out on the dependent and independent variables using SEM-PLS.  Since there 
are two dependent variables (price and nonprice), two structural models are constructed.  Figures 
1 and 2 illustrate the two models which consist of the dependent and independent variables.  The 
independent variables in Figures 1 and 2 are the same, however the dependent variable in Figure 
1 is nonprice while in Figure 2 is price.  All variables are treated as reflective measurement 
variables as the latent constructs exist independent of the measures used and variations in the 
constructs cause variations in the item measurements.  However, price and process_time are single 






Figure 1: Structural model with nonprice as dependent variable 
 
 




Figure 2: Structural model with price as dependent variable 
 
 
As the variables are all reflective, assessment of the models is first carried out in terms of the 
internal consistency, indicator reliability, convergent and discriminant validity.  Also calculated in 
the outer loading for each of the indicator.  The results of the assessment is provided in Table 3.
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Composite reliability AVE VIF 
price terms_price 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
nonprice 
terms_size 0.891 
0.858 0.853 0.601 
2.301 
terms_maturity 0.861 2.074 
terms_colla 0.894 2.131 
condition 
cond1 0.672 
0.741 0.835 0.631 
1.482 
cond2 0.786 1.578 
cond3 0.907 1.402 
capital 
cap1 0.700 
0.750 0.835 0.562 
1.597 
cap2 0.835 1.537 
cap3 0.633 1.375 
cap4 0.811 1.649 
collateral 
colla1 0.911 
0.853 0.899 0.690 
2.567 
colla2  0.877 2.255 
colla3  0.758 1.637 
colla4  0.767 1.815 
capacity 
capa1 0.900 
0.827 0.853 0.601 
2.517 
capa2  0.630 1.817 
capa3  0.920 2.024 
capa4  0.593 1.518 
 char1 0.526 
0.708 0.805 0.592 
1.279 
character char2  0.930 1.481 
 char3  0.795 1.466 
processing time process_time 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Internal consistency is first assessed using the Cronbach’s Alpha and it is found that all variables 
fulfill this condition, i.e. all Cronbach’s Alpha values for all the variables are greater than 0.7.  It 
is also found that the Composite Reliability values for all the variables are greater than 0.7, 
indicating sufficient convergence and/or internal consistency (Gefen et al., 2000).   Next, indicator 
reliability is assessed via the outer loading values of each item.  The outer loading values for each 
of the items are found to be greater than 0.5.  As a rule of thumb, according to Hulland (1999), 
reflective indicators with outer loading values less than 0.4 need to removed.  Most of the outer 
loadings are greater than 0.7 except for some items such as cond1 (0.672), cap3 (0.633), capa2 
(0.630), capa 4 (0.593) and char1 (0.526).  Although indicators with outer loadings found to be 
between 0.4 and 0.7 are not considered strong indicators, removal of these indicators is only 
suggested if the deletion increases the composite value and the Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE).   The indicators above are maintained and not deleted as it was found that their removal 
results in either the Cronbach’s Alpha values or the AVE values dropping to below the threshold.  
In fact, retaining these indicators is actually found to improve the models.   
 
Convergent validity is assessed via the AVE value of each of the variable.  The AVE values for 
all the variables are found to be between 0.562 and 0.690.  The values are greater than the required 
threshold of 0.5 as variables having AVE values greater than 0.5 are considered to have adequate 
Convergent validity (Bagozzi and Youjae, 1988).   Finally, to assess discriminant validity, the 
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio of correlations (HTMT) is calculated for each of the variable.  The 
resulting values are provided in Table 4.  HTMT values below 0.90 indicates that discriminant 
validity is established between two reflective constructs (Henseler et al., 2015).   Since all the 
values are less than 0.7, discriminant validity is established for the two models.  Although not 
provided, discriminat validity is also established via the Fornell-Larcker criterion (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981) as the values of the diagonal elements exceed those of the off-diagonal elements in 
the same row and column for both the models.   
 
Since both models fulfill the various assessment criterion, the structural models are evaluated.   
The results of both the structural models are presented in Table 5 (dependent variable: price) and 
Table 6 (dependent variable: nonprice).  Both the structural models show SRMR values of 0.093 
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Table 4: Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio of correlations (HTMT) 
  capacity capital character collateral condition price nonprice 
capacity        
capital 0.320       
character 0.339 0.604      
collateral 0.224 0.370 0.430     
condition 0.146 0.234 0.176 0.205    
price 0.224 0.267 0.326 0.447 0.188   
nonprice 0.362 0.135 0.146 0.096 0.249   
processing time 0.287 0.196 0.137 0.062 0.074 0.216 0.627 
 
Table 5: Summary of structural model (Dependent: price) 
 Path coefficient F2 R2 SRMR dULS 
capacity -> price -0.149* 0.038 
0.515 0.093 1.797 
capital -> price -0.174 0.043 
character -> price -0.079 0.009 
collateral -> price 0.008 0.000 
condition -> price 0.185** 0.068 
processing time -> price 0.601*** 0.644 
*** , ** , * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Table 6: Summary of structural model (Dependent: nonprice) 
 Path coefficient F2 R2 SRMR dULS 
capacity -> nonprice -0.099 0.015 
0.464 0.094 2.219 
capital -> nonprice -0.262* 0.083 
character -> nonprice -0.290** 0.108 
collateral -> nonprice 0.590*** 0.554 
condition -> nonprice -0.076 0.010 
processing time -> nonprice 0.259** 0.105 




The results of the price model show that the sensitivity of an SME’s business to the economic 
condition has a significant influence on the level of interest rates it is charged by the banks when 
they approve of the loan application.   The capacity of the SME is also significant in influencing 
the level of interest rates, although the influence is only significant at the 10% level.  For the non-
price model on the other hand, the character of the SME and its ability to provide collateral are 
highly significant in influencing the non-price of loan terms it is able to secure from the bank.  Its 
capital is only significant in influencing the non-price loan terms at the 10% level.  For both the 
models, processing time is found to have highly significant influence on the price and non-price 
terms of bank loans.  In terms of R-squared, the values are 0.515 and 0.464 for the price and non-
price models, respectively.  This indicates that the independent variables explain around 50% of 
the overall variations in the price and non-price terms of bank loans. 
 
Analysis for the non-price model is also carried out using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
method with robust standard errors.  Average values are calculated for the each variable that is a 
multi-item construct (nonprice, capacity, capital, character, collateral, condition).  Since 
process_time is a single item construct, the value is taken as is. The results of the regression 
analysis, presented in Table 7, confirm the PLS-SEM results. 
 
Table 7: OLS Regression Analysis (Dependent: nonprice) 
Variable Coef. t 
capacity -0.067 -0.550 
capital -0.337* -1.790 
character -0.291** -2.600 
collateral 0.400*** 5.420 
condition 0.010 0.110 
processing time 0.281*** 3.510 
constant 3.399*** 4.450 
N 74 
*** , ** , * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
 
Price terms of bank loans (interest rates) 
 
Among the five dimensions of creditworthiness, only condition is found to have a highly 
significant influence on the interest rates charged by banks on the loans they grant to SMEs, i.e. 
the price terms of the loan.   Hypothesis 5a is therefore supported at the 5% significance level. 
Condition refers to the sensitivity of the SME’s business to the economic condition.  The 
relationship between condition and price terms of a bank loan is found to be positive implying the 
better the condition (i.e. the less sensitive the business is to the economic condition), the better the 
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loan pricing offered by the bank (i.e. interest rates charged are lower).  This result is as expected 
as the sensitivity of the business affects its credit ratings.  Since unlike large firms, SMEs are 
dependent mainly on the domestic market (Anagnostopoulou and Drakos, 2016), the SME’s 
business is therefore more sensitive to the macroeconomic conditions thus affecting its probability 
of default (Dietsch and Petey, 2004).  The importance of condition to the interest rate charged by 
a bank is due to the SME’s dependence on the domestic market which affects its revenues 
(Anagnostopoulou and Drakos, 2016).   
 
Capacity is found to have a significant influence also but the influence is only significant at the 
10% level.  However, capacity has a negative influence on the price terms of loan which is opposite 
to what was hypothesized in Hypothesis 1a.  Although an SME which is highly capable of repaying 
its loans is viewed as less risky by financial institutions, its preference for internal funds and other 
informal sources of financing (Haron and Ibrahim, 2016) and its capability of generating internal 
funds would mean that it would request for smaller amounts of funds from financial institutions  
 
The other dimensions of creditworthiness – Capital, Character and Collateral – have no significant 
influence on the interest rates charged by banks for loans.  Hence, Hypotheses 2a, 3a and 4a are 
not supported by the results in Table 5.  Additionally, despite the significance of Condition and 
Capacity, the F2 values for these variables are less than 0.15, which implies small effect size 
(Cohen, 1988).   
 
On the other hand, processing time which represents soft information gathered by the banks 
regarding the SME is found to be highly significant (at 1% level) in influencing interest rates with 
the effect size being large (0.644).  Time taken to process a loan application is found to have a 
positive influence on interest rates, i.e. the longer time is taken to process a loan application, the 
lower the interest rates imposed by the banks.  Hypothesis 6a is therefore supported. Since SMEs 
are opaque in nature, there is high levels of information asymmetry which is reduced with more 
soft information gathered about the borrower hence credit risk is also reduced (Neuberger and 
Räthke-Doppner, 2015).  Reduced credit risk means lower interest rates charged by the banks on 
the loans given out to the SMEs.  The large effect size indicates the great significance of soft 
information in determining interest rates on loans, as compared to hard information used to assess 
the creditworthiness of an SME, due to the opaque nature of SMEs and their poor financial record 
keeping practices. 
 
Non-price terms of bank loans (size, maturity and collateral requirement) 
 
Among the five dimensions of creditworthiness, character and collateral are found to be highly 
significant (at 5% level) in influencing the non-price terms of bank loans.   Collateral is found to 
have a positive influence but character has a negative influence on the non-price terms of bank 
loans.  Capacity and condition have no significant influence on the non-price terms of the bank 
loans hence Hypotheses 1b and 5b are not supported by the results of this study.  Therefore, only 
Hypothesis 4b is supported while although hypothesis 3b is supported statistically, the relationship 
found is opposite to what was hypothesized.    
 
The positive influence of collateral on the non-price terms of bank loans indicates the role of 
collateral in reducing adverse selection and moral hazard (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004) and also the 
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demand for financial reporting (Minnis and Sutherland, 2017).  The pledging of collateral is 
therefore an indicator of the quality of the borrower where borrowers who are confident of their 
ability to repay their loans would be more willing to put up more and better collateral as they are 
less likely to lose the collateral (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004).   Hence, reduced risk means less 
strict non-price terms of loans imposed by the banks on the SME.   In terms of effect size, collateral 
is found to have F2 value of 0.554 which indicates large effect.  Among all the variables, collateral 
has the largest effect indicating the importance of this variable in influencing the non-price terms 
of a bank loan to an SME.  Hence, an SME that is able to provide collateral to back its loan request 
will be able to secure better non-price loan terms, i.e. larger loan sizes, longer loan maturities and 
lower collateral requirements. 
 
On the other hand, although Character is found to be significant, its influence is found to be 
negative but its effect on non-price terms of bank loans is small (0.108).  Character is thus 
important but does not have a very large effect on the non-price terms of bank loans.  Character is 
measured as the willingness of different parties (banks, business parties and investors) to provide 
credit or invest in the SME.  In this case, the better the character of the SME, i.e. the more parties 
there are available to provide the financing to the SME, the less the SME would turn to financial 
institutions for loans, i.e. the more avenues to financing available to the SME.  With more avenues 
for financing, the SME would only apply for smaller loans, which come with high interest rates. 
Additionally, an SME that has other alternative sources of financing might lack credit history as it 
may not have borrowed from formal sources previously thus resulting in higher rates of interests 
charged to the SME.  Alternatively, a more plausible explanation could be that this relationship is 
a result of the perception of the SME respondents.  Since the questions regarding the price and 
non-price terms of loans are answered by the SMEs and not based on hard data, the answer is 
subjective.  An SME with good character might in actual fact be getting better terms of loan from 
the bank’s point of view but the SME might not view the terms as better or favorable due to its 
own expectations on what it should be getting while those with dubious credit histories may be 
happy with the terms of loans offered to them.  This result provides opportunities for future 
research where lenders and borrowers view of the terms of loans may be analyzed.   
 
Capital is found to have a significant but weak influence (at 10% level) on the non-price terms of 
bank loans.  Additionally, an F2 value of 0.085 indicates small effect of this variable on the 
independent variable.  Hypothesis 2b is thus supported at the 10% level statistically but in terms 
of the sign of coefficient, this hypothesis is not supported.  An SME with large amounts of capital 
would rely more on its internal capital and hence lack credit history and borrowing information 
which increases asymmetric information (Shin and Park, 1999; Shen et al., 2009).  Therefore, the 
non-price terms of bank loans could be higher for these SMEs.   
 
Finally, soft information, measured by processing time, is found to have a significantly positive 
(at 5% level) influence on the non-price terms of bank loans, thus supporting Hypothesis 6b.  
Therefore the longer the time to process a loan application, the better the non-price terms of the 
loans will be.  The gathering of soft information reduces asymmetric information and hence with 
more information, the need to pledge collateral is reduced and large loan sizes with longer time to 
maturity can be offered.  With more soft information, monitoring costs are reduced and 
relationships are formed between the bank and the SME hence enabling better non-price terms to 
be offered (Bharath et al., 2011).  The effect size of this variable is however found to be 0.105, 
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which is small, unlike the effect size of this variable on the price terms of loans.  Soft information 
is therefore more important in determining the interest rates compared to the non-price terms of 
loans.  More soft information gathered reduces credit risk and this has a strong influence on interest 




The aim of this study was to analyze the factors that influence the terms of bank loans.  This study 
delves further by the price and non-price terms of bank loans separately.  To do this, responses 
from questionnaires returned by 74 SMEs from Selangor and the Federal Territory of Kuala 
Lumpur are utilized.  The questionnaire was distributed to 456 SMEs out of which 145 responses 
were returned but only 74 were usable for this study as these SMEs were granted loans within a 
period of 12 months.  The responses were analyzed via SEM-PLS and it was found that factors 
that significantly affect the price terms of bank loans are distinct from those that affect the non-
price terms of bank loans.  The economic condition and the capacity of the SME was significant 
in influencing the price terms of bank loans (i.e. the interest rates) while ability to provide 
collateral, the capital put up by the SME and the character of the SME were important in 
influencing the non-price terms of bank loans (i.e. size of loan, maturity of loan and collateral 
requirement).  However, soft information (proxied by time taken to process the loan application) 
was found to be significant in influencing both the price and non-price terms of bank loans, 
although its importance was greater in determining the price terms.  This indicates the importance 
of soft information in reducing asymmetric information and moral hazard problems and therefore 
loosening terms of loans.   
 
The results are important as to the author’s knowledge, no study so far has analyzed the terms of 
bank loans separately to provide a clearer picture of the differing importance and influence of each 
of the 5 dimensions of creditworthiness towards the different terms imposed by banks for the loans 
they offer to SMEs.  This study therefore provides SMEs with additional knowledge on what is 
important in bank loan applications.  Additionally, some of the results found are different from 
expectations and previous studies, indicating a few possibilities.  One, the results may be different 
for developing economies as compared to developed economies thus highlighting the need to carry 
out further studies in developing economies as the financial structure in these economies are 
different from those of developed ones. Second, most standard expectations and assumptions 
regarding the relationships are based on the large firms whereas SMEs are unique compared to 
large firms.  Hence, there is a need to analyze whether there are differences in the results for large 
firms and SMES.  Third, the questionnaires were answered by SMEs therefore this study provides 
the relationships based on the perceptions of the SMEs.  The differing results could indicate the 
different perceptions of SMEs and banks with respect to the loan terms offered hence there is a 
need to further study on these possible different perceptions and to hopefully bridge the gap that 
may be there between these two entities.    
 
However, this study has its limitations.  Firstly, the data source is unofficial, i.e. via survey 
questionnaires which are filled up by SMEs, therefore, there is bound to be bias as it is based on 
their perceptions.  Data from official sources such as banks or credit agencies, or even those which 
are quantitative in nature (usually obtained from banks) will provide a clearer picture of what 
influences the loan terms as the banks are the ones setting these terms.  The survey was also carried 
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out at one particular point in time hence restricting the analysis to cross-sectional analysis.  Due to 
the evolving nature of the financial system, the results may not be applicable in the future and 
therefore there is a need to carry out panel data analysis instead.    
 
This study also mainly focuses on the 5Cs of credit as proxies for hard information and processing 
time as a proxy for soft information gathered by the banks.  There are various credit analysis tools 
which employ different dimensions of creditworthiness and these dimensions were not taken into 
consideration in this study as the 5Cs of credit is popularly used in Malaysia.  Additionally, soft 
information can be measured in other ways such as the number of accounts held with the bank.  
Therefore future studies could include both processing time and number of accounts held as 
measures of soft information.   Other variables such as demographic ones were not considered in 
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